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Abstract  
 
As clearly stated by Pareto, no society can avoid the economic problem of “opposition 
between tastes and obstacles” that is, as in other categories of economic decisions, 
investments in education have to take into account their opportunity cost. This implies 
that when education policies need to be implemented, there is a previous need of 
comparing different actions and evaluating them to assess their attractiveness. In this 
comparison process, one of the technical difficulties which has to be solved is the choice 
of the correct mathematical aggregation rule (i.e. the commonly called investment 
evaluation criterion or discount method) to use. The internal rate of return (IRR) is 
widely used in educational policy and planning; the main justifications are three: 1) the 
choice of a discount rate may vary for different countries and at different times, while 
IRR is an “objective” measure, 2) IRR allows the comparison with investments in the 
private sector, and 3) IRR allows the comparison of investments in different educational 
fields, such as primary schooling and university (by simply considering the average rates 
of return in each field). However, the debate on the proper evaluation criterion to use, 
when a private investment decision has to be taken or a public project appraisal has to 
be carried out, is a traditional one in financial, public and production economics. 
Although the considerable amount of existing literature, the problem of the choice of the 
right investment evaluation criterion is still an open one. The majority of authors claim 
that net present value (NPV) is a superior criterion and thus it is the one to be always 
used. Other authors try to show that various investment evaluation criteria, under 
specific conditions, arrive at the same recommendation. This research aims at clarifying 
this controversial topic by focusing on some clear cut formal properties of the various 
investment evaluation criteria and by considering the empirical characteristics of the 
different fields of application.  Clear guidelines for education investment evaluation will 
be drawn.  
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1. Introduction  
 
There is no doubt that expenditures in education have to be considered as social 
investments in human capital presenting positive benefits for economic growth and 
societal well-being in general. However, as in other categories of economic decisions, 
investments in education have to take into account their opportunity cost and try to 
answer difficult questions such as: How much of the national budget has to be devoted 
to education? Have all forms of education be financed equally? Is it better to invest in 
pre-schooling or in universities? Private family investments have to deal with similar 
problems too, e.g. What topic to study? In which university?  
Economists try to answer these questions by considering the costs and benefits linked to 
each option (see e.g. Cohn and Huches, 1994; Wolff et al., 2014; Temple and Reynolds, 
2007).  In the case of private decisions, the literature, following the pioneering work of 
Mincer (1974), has focused on the earnings of a more educated person in comparison 
with less educated individuals. In the general cost-benefit framework, the costs are 
measured by the expenses to keep a student in school, plus his/her foregone earnings 
while studying. In the "Mincerian" method, one has to estimate wages by considering 
years of schooling and years of labor market experience as independent variables. 
However one has to note that even in individual decisions, non-pecuniary and social 
aspects are always present.  
Kaldor, one of the father of cost-benefit analysis, himself recognized that “individuals 
might, as a result of a certain political action, sustain losses of a non-pecuniary kind- 
e.g., if workers derive satisfaction from their particular kind of work, and are obliged to 
change their employment, something more than their previous level of money income 
will be necessary to secure their previous level of enjoyment; and the same applies in 
cases where individuals feel that the carrying out of the policy involves an interference 
with their individual freedom.” (Kaldor, 1939, p. 551). 
The full cost of one own education must include public subsidies (which often finance 
large part of the cost related with e.g. school infrastructures, teachers’ salaries, etc.) 
rather than just the amount an individual pays for his or her education. From an 
economic policy point of view, education should be public subsidized because of the 
positive externalities in terms of human capital accumulation, it produces. In fact if 
externalities are considered, such as better wealth, less criminality, higher female 
participation rate to the labour market, better parenting style, etc., social benefits will be 
much higher than private benefits (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). Aggregate human-
capital externalities can help in explaining cross-country differences in economic 
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development, the lack of capital flows to poor countries, the effects of agglomeration on 
economic growth, and other macroeconomic phenomena (Ciccone and Peri, 2006). From 
a public policy point of view, to assess these externalities is a key and difficult problem. 
However even if externalities are monetized in a fully satisfactory way and thus all costs 
and benefits would be “commensurable”, a technical difficulty has still to be solved, that 
is, which is the correct mathematical aggregation rule (i.e. the commonly called 
investment evaluation criterion or discount method) to use? 
This research tries to clarify this controversial topic by focusing on some clear cut formal 
properties of the various investment evaluation criteria and by considering the empirical 
characteristics of the different fields of application, i.e. private, public, financial and non-
financial (i.e. physical investment such as school infrastructures). Next Section describes 
the main investment evaluation criteria developed in the specialised literature and 
commonly used in practice. Section 3 contains a systematic comparison of these 
evaluation criteria by considering their formal properties and empirical consequences. 
Section 4 is specifically devoted to the most common used criterion in education policy 
and planning, i.e. the internal rate of return; finally some conclusions are derived. 
 
 
2. Main Investment Evaluation Criteria  
 
In this research, the “classical” investment evaluation criteria are taken into 
consideration, i.e. the net present value, the benefit cost ratio, the payback period and 
the internal rate of return. Let us assume that x is the investment cash flow, x= x0, x1, 
x2, ..., xN,  N the time horizon, and  i the discount rate to compute the present value of 
x. By defining           respectively the revenues and costs (including both capital costs 
(k) and running costs (e)) associated with cash flows   , their analytical formulations are 
the following: 
- Net Present Value (NPV), sometime called also Discounted Cash Flow (DCF): 
    ∑
  
      
 
             
The evaluation rule is: for project economic acceptability NPV must be positive; the 
higher the NPV the more desirable the investment. 
- Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR): 
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BCR=  
∑
  
      
 
   
∑
  
      
 
   
         
The evaluation rule is: for project economic acceptability BCR must be higher than one; 
the higher the BCR the more desirable the investment. 
- Profitability Index (PI): 
PI= 
∑
      
      
 
   
∑
  
      
 
   
           
It is a different version of the benefit cost ratio, where k refers to capital costs only; in 
summary, the profitability index is the ratio between NPV and the summation of the 
discounted capital costs. By using BCR or PI, the acceptability condition of a project 
gives the same result, but the investment ranking may change. The evaluation rule is: 
for project economic acceptability PI must be higher than one; the higher the PI the 
more desirable the investment. 
- Payback Period (PB): 
“The payback period of a project is found by counting the number of years it takes 
before the cumulative forecasted cash flow equals the initial investment” (Brealey and 
Meyers, 2003, p. 94). In mathematical terms, by defining with X(S), 1 S N  , the 
cumulative function of cash flows, i.e. X(S)=∑   
 
    , it is 
PB= mi  S : X S  ≥0 
The evaluation rule is: the lower the PB the more desirable the investment. A drawback 
of this criterion is that the time value of money is not taken into account since no 
discount rate is used. This problem is eliminated by using the Discounted Payback Period 
(DPB): 
DPB= min S : ∑
  
      
 
   ≥ 0 
- Internal Rate of Return (IRR): 
From a mathematical point of view, the internal rate of return is defined as the discount 
rate r if it exists and is unique, that makes the NPV of all cash flows of an investment 
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equal to zero (in summary r is the discount rate at which the NPV of positive cash flows 
is equal the NPV of negative cash flows).  
IRR= r: NPV=∑
  
      
 
    0        
The evaluation rule is: for project economic acceptability the higher the IRR the more 
desirable the investment. From an empirical point of view, the IRR can be considered as 
the growth rate of returns that an investment is estimated to produce, thus it is used 
with the meaning of an interest rate (although technically it is a discount rate). In real-
world practice, IRR is also used as a proxy of the opportunity cost of the investment, i.e. 
if no physical investment is able to generate an IRR bigger than the one of financial 
investments, thus it is better to invest on the financial market. Finally IRR can also be 
used as a measure linked to the cost of financial capital; if one has to borrow money to 
invest, this makes sense only if the expected investment IRR is bigger than the financial 
cost of the money to be borrowed on the financial markets. 
One should observe that neither the existence nor the uniqueness of IRR is always 
guaranteed. Levi (1964) and Norstrom (1972) indicate some sufficient conditions for 
existence, uniqueness and non-negativity of IRR. In the case of IRR, one should note 
that it loses its consistency, when more than one solution exists. This is clear if one 
looks at Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Consistency of NPV and IRR 
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In the case where IRR is not unique, it may happen that some solutions give the wrong 
advice. Although investment A is preferable to investment B clearly, IRR2(B) is bigger 
than IRR2(A), thus an inconsistency exists clearly. 
The debate on the proper evaluation criterion to use, when a private capital investment 
decision has to be taken or a public project appraisal has to be carried out, is a 
traditional one in financial and public economics literature (see e.g. Alchian, 1955; 
Bouding, 1948; Dorfman, 1981;  Fisher, 1930; Gordon, 1955; Hirshleifer, 1958; 
Lesourne, 1958; Lorie and Savage, 1955; Mishan, 1971; Osborne, 2010; Oehmke, 
2000; Samuelson, 1936; Scitowski, 1951; Solomon, 1956; Teichroew et al., 1965). More 
recently, this debate has extended to production and engineering economics too (see 
e.g. Chiang et al., 2010; Hartman and Schafrick, 2004; Hazen, 2003; Newnan et al., 
2011, Pasqual et al., 2013; Remer et al., 1993; Zhang,  2005). However, although the 
considerable amount of existing literature, the problem of the choice of the right 
investment evaluation criterion is still an open one. Moreover, a conflict between 
scholars and financial practice seems to exist, in fact large corporations and banks 
currently seem to prefer the internal rate of return or payback criteria to NPV (Brounen 
et al., 2004; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Kester et al., 1999; Liljeblom and Vaihekoski, 
2004;  Payne et al., 1999;  Ryan and Ryan, 2002); on the contrary, NPV is the one 
supported by the majority of scholars (see e.g. Brealey and Meyers, 2003; Luemberger, 
2012). Economics of education is the only relevant exception; in fact this is the only field 
where scholars too defend the use of IRR instead of NPV (e.g. Chetty et al., 2011; 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004; Woodhall, 2004). 
 
 
3. Comparison of the Main Investment Evaluation Criteria  
 
At this stage, one may ask two questions: 
1) Is there any general rule which can a priori, indicate when results of the different 
investment evaluation criteria coincide? 
2) When they provide different results, how can we choose the right investment 
evaluation criterion? 
To answer these questions properly, it is useful to consider different decision 
frameworks. According to Roy (1996), a decision problem formulation can take one of 
the following forms: 
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() the aim is to identify one and only one final project (choice problem); 
() the aim is the assignment of each project to an appropriate predefined category 
according to what one wants it to become afterwards (for instance, acceptance, rejection 
or delay for additional information) (sorting problem); 
() the aim is to rank all feasible projects according to a total or partial preorder 
(ranking problem). 
 
The answer to the first question (i.e. to specify when results of the different investment 
evaluation criteria coincide) is easy: the answer given by NPV, BCR and IRR investment 
evaluation criteria always coincide if one has to evaluate the absolute acceptability of a 
single project, i.e. we are in an “accept-reject” decision framework ( decision problem 
formulation). The proof is straightforward; in fact if a project has a positive (negative) 
NPV at a given level i0 of the discount rate, it necessarily has a BCR bigger (lower) than 
one, then both provide the same result. The same way of reasoning applies to the 
internal rate of return too.  
What happens with the payback period? If NPV is positive and BCR bigger than one, it 
necessarily must exist a payback year, but the opposite does not hold too, since the PB 
criterion completely ignores the cash flow values (positive or negative, large or small) 
after that period. Therefore, this criterion can give no information at all about the 
problem at hand. Some authors claim that an investment project should be accepted if 
its PB is smaller than a specified cutoff period, interpreted as an efficiency threshold of 
the considered productive sector (for an overview of this topic see e.g. Dobbs, 1996).     
The answer to the second question (i.e. how can we choose the right investment 
evaluation criterion?) is more complex. In economics and finance, a distinction is made 
between absolute and relative investment evaluation criteria, i.e. taking explicitly into 
account only the absolute value of the profit of a project, or its rate of profit, relative to 
a unit of invested financial capital. The net present value is an indicator of the financial 
attractiveness of an investment in absolute terms. It has been shown  (Hirshleifer, 1958) 
that NPV represent the right evaluation criterion only if the projects considered are 
mutually exclusive (in the framework of decision problem formulation) and a perfect 
capital market exists, i.e. no capital constraint has to be taken into consideration, of 
course this looks a quite optimistic assumption. 
If one uses investment evaluation criteria such as the benefit cost ratio, the profitability 
index or the internal rate of return the financial attractiveness of a project is 
  
 
11 
independent from the scale of such a project. In decision contexts where various 
projects have to be chosen but the budget available is limited, a very common real-world 
case indeed, a ranking is needed (decision problem formulation) and thus relative 
investment evaluation criteria such as the benefit cost ratio may look more appropriate 
than NPV. 
First of all, let us make clear that when a project ranking is the final objective of an 
evaluation, given that the assumptions underlying each investment evaluation criterion 
are different, the results they generate are different too. In the case of NPV and BCR, 
this difference can be easily shown graphically (for more details see Matarazzo, 1981, 
pp. 191-205). If for simplicity, we assume cumulative discounted positive cash flows 
equal to  ̅   ∑
  
      
 
       and cumulative discounted negative cash flows equal to  
 ̅   ∑
  
      
 
    ,  it is       ̅    ̅  while benefit cost ratio is 
 ̅
 ̅
 . In Figure 2, it is 
clear that given the project I, the benefit cost ratio is 
 ̅
 ̅
        while        ̅    ̅ is 
given by the straight-line AC. Let us now consider three projects             and by using 
the same way of reasoning described for Figure 2, in Figure 3 one can see that according 
to the benefit cost ratio, since it is              the ranking of the three projects is 
          , while according to the net present value, it is            . 
 
 
Figure 2. Graphical representation of NPV and BCR 
(Source: Matarazzo, 1981, p. 193) 
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Figure 3. Graphical representation of project rankings according to NPV and BCR 
(Source: Matarazzo, 1981, p. 195) 
 
 
Let us now compare NPV and IRR. By looking at Figure 4, it is clear that according to 
IRR, investment G is preferred to investment H; but according to NPV, if the discount 
rate is lower than 15.6, H is definitely more attractive than G. One may easily 
understand that the only case where both NPV and IRR supply the same ranking is when 
all NPV graphics do not intersect one another and IRR exists and is unique. This is a very 
peculiar case, far from being common in the real-world experience (and almost 
impossible if the number of investments to compare is high). 
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Figure 4. Graphical representation of project rankings according to NPV and IRR 
(Source: Brealey and Meyers, 2003, p. 103) 
 
 
The payback criterion is not comparable with any of the other investment evaluation 
criteria. This because it does not take into consideration the cash-flows after the payback 
year and thus the time horizon is different. This evaluation criterion has been criticised 
heavily because it ignores all cash flows after the cut-off date. “In order to use the 
payback rule, a firm has to decide on an appropriate cutoff date. If it uses the same 
cutoff regardless of project life, it will tend to accept many poor short-lived projects and 
reject many good long-lived ones.” (Brealey and Meyers, 2003, p. 95). This criticism is 
correct obviously, thus a legitimate question is: why so many real-world investments are 
evaluated by using PB? In my opinion, the main (and maybe unique) reason is that the 
concept of PB is very understandable, intuitive and simple, or better, from a scientific 
point of view, simplistic. 
In the framework of the debate on the maximization assumption in microeconomics, 
Musgrave (1981) made a very useful classification of the assumptions made in economic 
theory. He makes a distinction between negligibility assumptions, domain assumptions 
and heuristic assumptions. The first type is required to simplify and focus on the essence 
of the phenomena studied. The second type of assumption is needed when applying a 
theory to specify the domain of applicability. The third type is needed either when a 
theory cannot be directly tested or when the essential assumptions give rise to such a 
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complex model that successive approximation is required.  An important 
negligibility/heuristic assumption underlying all the investment evaluation criteria 
considered here is that cash flows are under conditions of certainty. Knight (1921, p. 
313) clearly stated: "... We live in a world of contradiction and paradox, a fact of which 
perhaps the most fundamental illustration is this: that the existence of a problem of 
knowledge depends on the future being different from the past, while the possibility of 
the solution of the problem depends on the future being like the past". In a heuristic 
framework, PB may be seen as a first approximation to real-world uncertainty, as 
information about the turnover speed. Agents know that to invest is always a risky 
activity and that reality is dynamic e.g. new investment opportunities with higher profits 
might appear, thus PB minimisation is a rationale objective for them. Given that indeed 
NPV or BCR measure the financial attractiveness of an investment and PB its connected 
uncertainty (at least as a proxy), there is the possibility to consider PB as 
complementary to NPV or BCR. One should note the importance of domain assumptions 
here. In fact, while to use PB in the private sector is understandable, at least from a 
psychological point of view, this is not in the case of public investments.  
A proper evaluation of policy options needs to deal with a plurality of legitimate values 
and interests found in a society. From a societal point of view, financial optimization 
cannot be the only evaluation criterion. As already discussed, not all goods have a 
market price (non-pecuniary benefits), or this price is often too low (market failures). 
Distributional consequences (intra/inter-generational) must also be taken into account. 
If it is accepted that society as a whole has an indefinite lifespan (thus e.g. cultural 
heritage is a key intergenerational equity issue), a much longer time horizon than is 
normally used on the market is required; a contradiction then arises since the use of PB 
would be consistent with a very short time horizon only. From a descriptive point of 
view, probably this is correct, since often policy-makers consider four-five year time 
horizon, depending on the electoral system; this has the effect that long term societal 
goals are rarely among their priorities (thereby causing a government failure). However 
from a normative point of view, public authorities should be benevolent policy-makers1; 
for this reason, I think that evaluation of public projects should take into account the 
entire “civil society”, including ethical concerns about future generations, thus the use of 
PB is not advisable for public project evaluation.  
At this stage, it is clear that the relevant research question is: shall we use NPV, BCR or 
IRR? Here, I will defend the following answer: when a ranking is needed and the capital 
                                           
1 For an overview of different perspectives on the role of governments in the economic sphere see 
e.g. Buchanan and Musgrave, 1999. 
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is limited, the correct investment criterion to use depends on 1) the fact that the 
investment is financial (e.g. teachers’ salaries, education vouchers, etc.) or physical 
(e.g. school buildings, computers and so on) and 2) on the private or public nature of it.  
A) Financial investments. In this case, the correct ranking can be easily obtained by 
using NPV inside a linear programming (LP) model (One should note that Hirshleifer, 
1958 already proposed this type of solution, although in a pure economic theoretical 
framework). In fact in the case of pure financial investments, these ones are generally 
fractional in nature, (LP may supply as a result to choose one unit of investment A, ¾ of 
investment B, ½ of C, etc. ) thus NPV can be considered the objective function to be 
maximized by considering all the possible combinations of the feasible investments. This 
type of solution is clearly valid for both private and public financial investments. 
B) Private physical investments. Physical investments in their great majority are not 
fractional; in this case, if one wishes to use a LP optimization model, there is a need to 
apply integer linear programming. One should note that no exact algorithm exists for the 
integer case of LP, in fact it is a so-called NP-hard problem2. Considering that in general 
the feasible options are limited in number and not repeatable (e.g. one cannot build two 
times the same school building in the same location), in this case to use BCR looks a 
rational option, since investment projects are ranked according to their relative financial 
performance per unit of capital invested. Even when the investment is repeatable (e.g. 
to buy computers, TV sets, etc.), BCR supplies a rational solution if used in a 
lexicographic framework; that is, once the option with the highest BCR has been 
completely exploited, if some capital is still available, the second position in the ranking 
is used and so on till the capital is used completely.  
C) Public physical investments. Of course, all the arguments already considered for 
private physical investments apply to the public ones too. In addition to these 
arguments, we have to consider that in the case of public investments, social issues 
have also to be taken into consideration. Economic development implies the creation of 
new assets in terms of physical, human, social and cultural structures. Within a process 
of “creative destruction” traditional assets derived from a society’s common heritage 
may disappear. The existence of a plurality of social actors, with interest in the policy 
being assessed, generates a conflictual situation. ”...  Looking at a single individual, ... 
He is prevented from being better off than he is, not only because total production is 
                                           
2 The complexity class of decision problems that are intrinsically harder than those that can be 
solved by a nondeterministic Turing machine in polynomial time. When a decision version of a 
combinatorial optimization problem is proved to belong to the class of NP-complete problems, then 
the optimization version is NP-hard (definition given by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, http://www.nist.gov/dads/HTML/nphard.html ). 
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limited, but also because so much of total production is at the disposal of persons other 
than himself. The same thing holds, of course, for any group or society of individuals, so 
long as that group is less than the totality of a closed community” (Hicks, 1939, p. 698-
699). Welfare economics proposes the measurement of social costs and benefits made 
on the basis of the so called compensation principle (usually associated with the names 
of Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1939)). 
In empirical applications, the compensation principle is implemented by using social 
cost-benefit analysis, where costs and benefits are aggregated linearly in a net present 
value formula. The assumption underlying the NPV rule is that of an additive social 
welfare function, such as 
hh
SW U   where the subscript h denotes the individual to 
whom the utility function applies. Under the assumption that the marginal utility of 
money income is identical for all individuals, the variation of this social welfare function 
indicating the social worth of a project is computed by using a NPV formula. 
Nevertheless, the assumption of a constant marginal utility of income across individuals 
is a distributional question, and that assumption embodies particular social values 3 . 
Given that society is unlikely to be indifferent among various possible distributions of 
income, some ways of integrating the distributional aspects into the analysis have to be 
found. The most popular methodology is to introduce distributional weights explicitly, by 
using different weights for different social groups (Bojo et al., 1990). However, it is not 
clear how to derive such weights, since they can be based on a variety of ethical, 
philosophical and methodological principles and who should attach them (economists, 
policy-makers, society, ...).  On the other hand, it must be clear that failures to use any 
weighting system imply making the implicit value judgments either that the existing 
distribution of income is optimal and/or the change in income distribution is negligible. 
If, and only if, one is happy with such value judgments, it is reasonable to use un-
weighted market valuations to measure costs and benefits. Therefore, there is no escape 
                                           
3 One should indeed note that Kaldor proposed the compensation principle exactly to avoid the 
principle one individual one vote, since equality was in his opinion a problem. “Consider the Repeal 
of the Corn Laws. This tended to reduce the value of a specific factor of production-land. It can no 
doubt be shown that the gain to the community as a whole exceeded the loss to the landlords-but 
only if individuals are treated in some sense as equal. Otherwise how can the loss to some-and 
that there was a loss can hardly be denied-be compared with the general gain?” (Kaldor, 1939, p. 
549); and then he presented the solution to this “criticism”: “ … It is only as a result of this 
consequential change in the distribution of income that there can be any loss of satisfactions to 
certain individuals, and hence any need to compare the gains of some with the losses of others. 
But it is always possible for the Government to ensure that the previous income-distribution 
should be maintained intact: by compensating the " landlords " for any loss of income and by 
providing the funds for such compensation by an extra tax on those whose incomes have been 
augmented. In this way, everybody is left as well off as before in his capacity as an income 
recipient; while everybody is better off than before in his capacity as a consumer. For there still 
remains the benefit of lower corn prices as a result of the repeal of the duty” (Kaldor, 1939, p. 
550). 
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from value judgments.  It has to be noted that this conclusion contradicts the main 
argument which Hicks used as a defense of the compensation principle, since he was 
very attracted by its apparent objectivity. In fact Hick’s was very worried by a positivist 
attack to normative economics, which he himself agreed with “ … Positive economics can 
be, and ought to be, the same for all men; one's welfare economics will inevitably be 
different according as one is a liberal or a socialist, a nationalist or an internationalist, a 
christian or a pagan” (Hicks, 1939, p. 696). The compensation principle was a solution to 
this problem: “By adopting the line of analysis set out in this paper, it is possible to put 
welfare economics on a secure basis, and to render it immune from positivist criticism”. 
(Hicks, 1939, p. 711) “…  I have accomplished my end if I have demonstrated the right 
of Welfare Economics - the "Utilitarian Calculus" of Edgeworth - to be considered as an 
integral part of economic theory, capable of the same logical precision and the same 
significant elaboration as its twin brother, Positive Economics, the "Economical Calculus" 
” (Hicks, 1939, p. 712). 
We should take for granted the existence of a multiplicity of legitimate values in society. 
Any social decision problem is characterised by conflicts between competing values and 
interests and different groups and communities that represent them (Munda, 
forthcoming). Any policy option always implies winners and losers, thus it is important to 
check if a policy option seems preferable just because some dimensions (e.g. the 
cultural one) or some social groups (e.g. the lower income groups) are not taken into 
account. From an operational point of view, it is then better to have a ranking of the 
different policy options rather than to select just one project; in fact, in this way social 
compromises may be easier. For example, the second or the third project in the ranking 
may minimize social opposition, while the top one could maximize it. In this way, policy-
makers can balance efficiency and equity concerns in a more transparent way (Munda, 
2009).  
Moreover, one should remember that NPV, being an indicator of the attractiveness of an 
investment in absolute terms, always considers large scale projects as the most 
desirable ones. In this way, large public investments in infrastructures (e.g. a new 
university campus) will always be considered more desirable than smaller investments 
(e.g. ICT equipment, teachers’ training, … ). I think this is not desirable for at least a 
couple of reasons: 
1) Large projects are necessarily localized in precise parts of a national territory, 
thus social conflicts and equity concerns are more probable to appear. However, 
one should note that this argument applies of course only for physical 
investments. Financial ones, such as the Erasmus + program (worth 14.7 billions 
Euro) is not localized in any specific European place. 
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2) Large infrastructural projects are usually the ones with the highest negative 
externalities from the social, cultural and environmental points of view. From a 
sustainability point of view, this is not often a desirable public policy. 
 
As a conclusion we may state that in a social cost-benefit analysis to have a ranking of 
projects, by using the BCR investment evaluation criterion, i.e. the return, relative to a 
single unit of invested capital, is more desirable than to use a NPV formula. 
 
 
4. Why to Use the Internal Rate of return?  
 
What about IRR? Apart from its (apparent) attractive meaning due to its “objectivity” (no 
hypothesis is needed about the selection of the discount rate to compute present value), 
I think that the reasons for its popularity in the private sector are twofold. First in the 
same way of PB, it could be considered a measure of uncertainty; in fact, one should 
consider that it makes sense to use IRR when existence and uniqueness conditions 
apply. These conditions, which are sufficient but not necessary (Norstrom, 1972), imply 
that to have a unique IRR, it is sufficient that the average investment costs appear in a 
point of time before than the average revenues. This is the case for e.g. most of the 
investments in infrastructures, provided that the chosen time horizon is relatively short. 
In fact if at some point of time, large amounts of renovation costs appear, IRR 
uniqueness could disappear. Moreover, given that IRR is the same for all cash flows 
along the time horizon (while in the NPV and BCR calculations, a plurality of discount 
rates can be used along the time horizon), Norstrom’s conditions cause that costs 
receive a bigger weight than revenues (since costs appear in average before revenues 
and thus their undervaluation due to the discount effect is lower) and as a consequence, 
long term investments are penalized. Thus an analogy with PB exists and the same line 
of criticism also applies here. 
Second, as noted by Massé (1962) when a loan is needed for an investment (very 
common state of affairs in the real world), IRR is a measure of the maximum interest 
rate that an agent can pay for capital availability. No doubt, this information can be 
useful for e.g. a manager of a private university. However one should note that to use 
IRR for this purpose may imply the risk of losing uniqueness, since Bernhard (1962) and 
Teichroew et al.,  (1965) showed that “a project has to be a mixture of an investment 
and a loan in order not to have a unique internal rate of return” (Norstrom, 1972, p. 
1838). Therefore, an implicit assumption of IRR is that any financial complementary 
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operation (e.g. a loan) should be possible at the same IRR of the project at hand. 
Obviously this assumption is not necessarily fulfilled in a real-world situation. 
With reference to the public sector, the use of IRR may be justifiable on completely 
different grounds. In real-world public policy, a field where IRR is widely used is 
educational planning; the main justifications provided by scholars are three:  
1) The choice of a discount rate may vary for different countries and at different times, 
while IRR is an “objective” measure.  The costs of this apparent objectivity have been 
already extensively discussed in previous pages of this report. 
2) IRR allows the comparison of investments in different educational fields, such as 
primary schooling and university (by simply considering the average rates of return in 
each field).  This is not a particular strong argument, since the same comparison could 
be done by using the benefit cost ratio. CBR has the characteristic of being a relative 
measure of investment attractiveness, like IRR, but it has the advantages of a) avoiding 
all computational complexities of IRR and b) not having the short term bias linked to 
IRR.  
3) IRR allows the comparison with investments in the private sector. This third argument 
is worthy to be explored more in depth. 
 
As it is well known, in a perfectly competitive world provided that there are no 
distortions in capital markets and that all agents have perfect information, the 
suggestions of cost-benefit analysis imply a Pareto efficient resource allocation if the 
discount rate is set equal to the market interest rate. Since the real-world does not 
fulfills these ideal conditions, economists have proposed several theories for the choice 
of the social discount rate, but the choice of an appropriate social discount rate for public 
policy evaluation is still one of the most controversial topics in the economic literature 
(see e.g. Baumol, 1968; Dasgupta and Pearce, 1972; Eckstein 1961; Feldstein, 1964; 
Frederick et al., 2002; Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989; Marglin, 1963; Mishan, 1967; 
Prest and Turvey, 1965; Ramsey, 1928; Seagreves, 1970; Sen, 1961). 
The most important theories are two: social time preference rate (STPR) and social 
opportunity cost of capital (SOC). STPR is composed by the societal time preferences, 
i.e. the rate at which a society is willing to postpone a unit of current consumption for 
obtaining more future consumption and the consumption growth rate (corrected by 
considering its decreasing marginal utility). STPR has been criticized mainly because: 
a) Individuals have to deal with the risk of death and thus positive pure time 
preference (i.e. considering the future as less important than the present) is a 
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rational behavior. However society as a whole is not a mortal body, thus valuing 
utility of future generations less than the present generation, is ethically 
unacceptable. 
 
b) If STPR is calculated by considering the consumption growth rate only, the 
previous criticism does not apply anymore. The justification for discounting is 
simply that future generations will be richer. However, are we sure that future 
real GDP will be higher? Moreover, even if GDP growth rate is positive in real 
terms, are we sure that this effect will not be compensated by the population 
growth rate? It may happen that the per capita future GDP is even lower than the 
current one. 
 
The proposal for using the social opportunity cost of capital is based on the empirical 
argument that resources in any economy are scarce; no society can avoid the economic 
problem of “opposition between tastes and obstacles”, as Pareto made clear. This implies 
that the public and private sectors compete for the same funds. As a consequence, 
public investments should guarantee at least the same profitability as private 
investments; otherwise a Pareto improvement can be obtained by reallocating resources 
to the private sector. In this framework, IRR could be a useful public investment 
evaluation criterion, since a relationship with the market interest rate is created.  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
When education policies need to be implemented, there is a previous need of comparing 
different actions and evaluating them to assess their social attractiveness. Education 
investments can be evaluated according to different objectives; we may have simple 
“accept-reject” decisions, there could be a need of choosing only one project among a 
set of competitive alternatives or the construction of a complete ranking is needed. In 
the former case, when no comparison between different projects is required all 
evaluation investment criteria considered give the same results (with the exception of 
the PB, that cannot be compared with the other investment criteria since the time 
horizon is different). In the second case, if one and only one project has to be chosen, 
then the decision should be made on the grounds of the highest NPV. In the latter 
situation, the choice of the right evaluation criterion to use is more complex, since the 
various evaluation criteria provide different results to the ranking problem. In this 
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decision environment, one has to consider three factors: 1) if the investment is private 
or public, 2) if the investment is financial or physical, 3) if the capital available is limited 
or not. 
In the case of pure financial investments (both private and public), these ones are 
generally fractional in nature, thus NPV can be considered the objective function to be 
maximized inside a linear programming model, given a fixed amount of capital. This 
solution is also consistent with the marginalistic tradition. Another decision context 
arises when various physical projects have to be chosen and the budget available is 
limited; in this case a ranking is needed and benefit cost ratio may look more attractive 
than NPV both for private and social investments.  
Both payback and internal rate of return can be considered just a first approximation for 
dealing with real-world uncertainty. Both criteria can be considered only as 
complementary in nature with NPV and BCR, when private investments have to be 
evaluated. In this context PB performs slightly better than IRR, since it is of a more 
general applicability and more intuitive meaning.  
When a loan is needed for an investment, IRR is a threshold measuring the maximum 
interest rate that an agent can pay for capital availability; however one should note that 
existence and uniqueness conditions in this case do not necessary hold. IRR can also be 
interpreted as a proxy of the financial opportunity cost of a physical investment. 
In the case of public investments, PB should never be used. IRR could have a role as an 
approximation of the social opportunity cost of capital, although one has to remember 
that its use implies an undervaluation of long term effects of the public investments 
considered.  
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